2012年3月26日星期一

扣分停牌上訴

特首選舉完結,標少也有點失落,一下子消失了很多寫作的題材,惟有安份守己,找件上訴案來胡謅。

今天司法機構上載了這件上訴:香港特別行政區 訴 李德榮 HCMA885/2011

一件很簡單的扣滿分停牌上訴案,上訴人第二次扣滿分,運輸署向法庭申請停牌,裁判官根據法例第375道路交通(違例駕駛記分)條例,頒令停牌6個月。上訴人不服,提出3點上訴理由。第一點上訴理由有關扣分的計算方法,純粹是上訴人無知,不值得在此討論。第二點上訴理由是上訴人投訴案件提訊的時間,是他在監獄服刑完畢之前的一個星期,比原定時間推遲了5個月,如果照原定時間提訊,他6個月的停牌,會在刑滿出獄不久完結。原審裁判官押後判令停牌所持理由是:

本庭在處理記滿分停牌事宜的一貫做法,都是一視同仁,人人平等。當違例記分者在服刑期間,他的記分停牌案件都會押後至他即將出獄的時間到庭處理。
本庭認為違例駕駛記分制度的設立是為了改善道路安全,有關違例記分法例和當中的停牌命令的主要目的,是阻嚇經常違反交通規例的駕駛者、提高駕駛水平及改善駕駛態度,從而減少交通意外所引致的人身傷亡和財物損失。

因此,既然法庭有責任保障其他嚴守法紀和小心謹慎的道路使用者,所以法庭必須作出有效用、有阻嚇力和懲罰性的命令。假若當上訴人在囚期間己被判處因記分停牌的命令,而該停牌令在他出獄前已屆滿,這個處理方式與違例記分條例實是背道而馳,猶如紙上談兵,毫無意義可言;假若上訴人另案的監禁刑罰與本案記分條例中的停牌命令『同期執行』的話,哪會有阻嚇力?哪會有懲罰性? (在上訴判辭中引用原審裁判官裁斷陳述書的理據)

聽審上訴的張慧玲法官同意原審裁判官的講法,判辭這樣講:

18. 就上訴人的第二個論點,本席完全認同裁判官的論點。裁判官的做法合法、合理。裁判官並無濫用職權,亦無不公之處。上訴人確在第一項違例事項起計兩年內因多次違例而被記多於15 分,符合該法例第8(1) 條的規定。上訴人亦非首次被吊銷駕駛資格,因此根據第8(3)(b) 條須「停牌」6 個月。若「停牌」令在上訴人服刑期間生效,確是毫無意義,完全無阻嚇作用,實與違例記分條例的目的背道而馳。 (香港特別行政區 訴 李德榮 HCMA885/2011第18段)

標少不同意兩位法官的理據。 記分條例的訂立及施行,都沒有訂出停牌施行的時間和方式,只要司機扣滿分,就自動進入有關法庭程序。法官不應以行政手段來干預正常的法庭程序,假如上訴人的刑期是幾年,豈不是要押後幾年才開始停牌。萬一今天判令我停牌,過幾天我因為別的案件判監,停牌令也不會暫緩執行。或者今天停我牌,我之後去了環遊世界,停牌也是毫無意義。無論法例怎樣訂立,始終有些情況管不到。如果屬於漏洞,就應該修例堵塞,而並非靠法官自己用行政辦法解決。危險駕駛引致他人死亡的案件,判監之外的停牌也不是服刑之後開始執行,停牌在服刑期間生效,確是毫無意義。但以行政手段來表述立法的意義,也不是正確司法態度。

上訴人第3點的投訴是質疑為何控方在他最後違例事項定罪扣滿分時,不立刻申請停牌,以下一段是上訴判辭的理據,簡單來講:不知道。


19. 就第三個論點,為何控方不在上訴人最後違例事項被定罪時申請取消上訴人的駕駛執照,本席不知曉。若上訴人認為律政司辦事不力,可向有關當局作出投訴。同樣,若上訴人認為運輸署人員需時8 個月才向法庭申請傳票也屬辦事不力,他亦應向運輸署或有關部門反映。


其實答案很簡單,首先,交通違例的檢控由律政司處理,但扣分方面由運輸署監管。就算上訴人最後違例事項定罪扣滿分,主控官也不能立即向法庭申請停牌,因為法例規定由運輸署長向法庭申請傳票傳召扣滿分的人上庭處理(S.8(2) Cap 375)。由確定所扣分數(包括被扣分人會否上訴以致成功註銷一些所扣分數)、申請傳票、排期及派發傳票,動輒要幾個月的時間。辦事不力恐怕並非真正理由,這程序上的東西理應由上訴聆訊代表控方的檢控官向法庭解釋,而不應由法官胡亂猜測。








5 則留言:

  1. Bill,

    I respectfully disagree. I would rely on 孔令國 CAAR 7/2009 for the prospective nature of disqualification orders and on 朱廣雲 HCMA 509/2009 on the validity of avoiding injustice by 'administrative measures'.

    Cheers,
    I

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    1. I,

      Thank you for disagreeing. I am afraid we are talking about two different scenarios. From the appeal I commented, I do not see any element of evading to attention court so that the deft waited until he was in jail to deal with the disqualification order. If it just happens the deft is incarcerated, the magistrate has to issue a body order to bring up the deft in court as a normal course of event. A deliberate administrative measure to delay the proceeding is not a correct approach which is analogous to the delaying tactics of the deft. 孔令國talks about the court should impose a forward thinking disqualification when the court has the power to impose disqualification alongside the jail sentence. 朱廣雲 clearly tried to avoid the individual disqualification and ended up facing the music at different time. The delay was not the fault of the magistrate. Yet, there was no discussion of the totality principle in the appeal. I should say both cases are distinguishable from the instant case. While it is correct to tackle the evading attitude of defts by disregarding the summonses served on them and their failure to appear in court, there is no justification as a practice to deal with the disqualification towards the end of the jail sentence of the deft unless there is clear element of evasion. Don't forget, the delay in the instant case was occasioned by the magistrate and not by the deft.

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  2. Hi, Bill and I

    Just a share of my thought.

    It appears that the LegCo was aware of the "loophole" related to the disqualification order and thus enacted s69A of the Road Traffic Ordinance in 2010 to govern the beginning of disqualification order in some situations. Given that LegCo was aware of the loophole but chose to plug it only in certain situations, I tend to agree Bill's view that it was inappropriate for the court to delay the start of the disqualification order by postponing the trial.

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    1. Just wanna clarify my thought a little bit.

      From the enactment of s69A, it appears that the LegCo was aware that jail term (whether caused by the traffic offences or not) may render the disqualification meaningless. Yet, the LegCo chose to deal with this problem only in certain situations and did not give the court the power to order the beginning of the disqualification as the court sees fit. It seems to me that it is objectionable for the court to manipulate the beginning of the disqualification by delaying the trial.

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    2. Anonymous,

      Thank you for the enlightenment. I am not aware of the addition of S.69A. I can certainly enjoy the benefit of learning through agreement and disagreement.

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